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Abstract 
This paper contains a critique of solvency regulation such as imposed on banks by Basel I and 
II. It argues that banks seeking to maximize rate of return on risk-adjusted capital (RORAC) 
aim at an optimal level of solvency because on the one hand, solvency S lowers the cost of re-
financing; on the other, it ties costly capital. In period 1, exogenous changes in mean returns 
dµ  and in volatility occur, causing optimal adjustments dS* / dµ  and dS* / dσ  in period 2. 
Since banks reallocate their assets with certain µ and σ values in response to the changed sol-
vency level, an endogenous trade-off with slope  / d d µ σ  results in period 3. Both Basel I and 
II are shown to modify this slope, inducing at least some banks to opt for a higher value of σ  
in certain situations. Therefore, this type of solvency regulation can prove counter-productive
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1 Introduction 
The concept of risk-adjusted capital was originally developed for the performance measure-
ment of a bank’s trading division. However, in the meantime return on risk-adjusted capital 
(RORAC) has increasingly become the benchmark for assessing an entire bank’s performance 
and governance. At the same time, public regulators are concerned about solvency to ensure 
the continuity of a bank’s operations. This paper deals with the conflict between optimization 
of RORAC (which also implies an optimal solvency level) and exogenously imposed sol-
vency levels, taking Basel I and Basel II as the example. It does so by distinguishing exoge-
nous  ( ) , µ σ  and endogenous (µ,σ) components in expected returns and volatility of returns. 
In a first period, exogenous shocks ( , d d µ σ )impinge on the bank’s optimum. A typical cause 
could be investments made in the previous period that turn out to have a lower rate of return 
or a higher volatility than expected. In the second period, banks optimally adjust their sol-
vency levels by  */ dS dµ  and  */ dS dσ , respectively. In the third period, they target new 
values of µ and σ on a perceived efficiency frontier with slope  / d d µ σ , which is implied by 
*/ dS dµ ,  */ dS dσ , and the fact that a single net adjustment dS* occurred. 
This efficiency frontier is modified by solvency regulation such as Basel I and II. It will be 
shown that Basel I simply sets a lower limit on (partially risk-adjusted) capital, neglecting that 
this limit should reflect both µ  and σ  and the fact that the relationship between solvency and 
capital depends on µ  and σ  as well. As to Basel II, it addresses solvency directly but fails to 
take into account the fact that a bank that initially just met this standard must come up with 
additional capital when µ  falls or σ  increases. Therefore both Basel I and II modify the effi- 
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ciency frontier  / d d µ σ  as perceived by regulated banks. While one might expect that these 
regulations cause the slope of the frontier to become steeper (thus inducing banks to opt for 
lower µ  and lower σ ), it turns out that the opposite can be the case. Indeed, both, Basel I and 
II may have the unexpected (and presumably counter-productive) consequence of causing at 
least some banks in some constellations to opt for a higher value of σ  (i.e. higher volatility of 
the rate of return on their assets) than without it. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the pertinent literature to 
conclude that solvency regulation indeed may serve to avoid negative externalities. In section 
3, a higher level of solvency is found to have two effects for banks aiming to maximize 
RORAC. On the one hand, it serves to lower their cost of refinancing; on the other, it ties 
capital that would have other, more productive uses. In section 4, comparative statics are used 
to derive optimal second-period adjustments of solvency to exogenous first-period changes in 
rate of return  */ dS dµ  and in volatility  */ , dS dσ  respectively. The net adjustment results in 
the bank’s third-period endogenous tradeoff  / d d µ σ . Next, the regulations imposed by Basel 
I and II are introduced as parameter restrictions to show how  / d d µ σ  is modified, possibly 
resulting in regulated banks opting for a higher value of σ  than on their own. A summary and 
conclusions follow in section 5. 
2 Literature review 
The solvency regulation of banks has traditionally been justified by the external costs of in-
solvency, especially in the guise of a bank run (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). This view was 
challenged by the proponents of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, who emphasized that for 
well-diversified investors, the solvency of a bank does not constitute a reasonable objective. 
They are concerned with expected profitability, possibly adjusted for the degree to which the 
bank’s profitability systematically varies with the capital market (the Beta of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model). By way of contrast, for little-diversified investors (among them, ordinary 
consumers holding deposits with the bank), the bank’s overall risk is relevant, which impor-
tantly  includes  the  risk  of  insolvency  [Goldberg  and  Hudgins  (1996),  Park  and  Peristiani 
(1998), Jordan (2000), Goldberg and Hudgins (2002)]. Option Pricing Theory shows that due 
to their limited liability, shareholders of the bank in fact have a put option that is written by  
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the other stakeholders (notably creditors) of the bank [Merton (1974), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Merton (1977)]. 
When a solvency risk materializes, internal and external costs need to be distinguished. Inter-
nal costs are borne by the bank’s shareholders, who see the value of their shares drop to zero 
unless the bank is in business again. However, in view of the loss of reputation, this re-entry 
would meet with high barriers to entry [Smith and Stulz (1985), pp. 395-396, Stulz (1996), 
pp. 9-12]. In addition, insolvency has external costs (i.e. costs not borne by the insolvent 
bank). First, the insolvency may trigger a bank run [Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya (1988), Bauer and Ryser (2004)]. Depositors who are late to withdraw their 
funds stand to lose part of their assets. Some of these depositors may be banks themselves; 
therefore, the insolvent bank may drive other financial institutions into bankruptcy, causing 
substantial external costs [Lang and Stulz (1992), Furfine (2003)]. Second, investors in the 
capital market at large often are affected as well. A bank that becomes insolvent causes own-
ers and creditors of banks in general to re-evaluate the estimated risk of insolvency. In re-
sponse to the revised estimate, they demand a higher rate of interest from their banks, driving 
up the cost of refinancing. There is a substantial body of empirical research substantiating this 
claim [Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Park and Peristiani (1998), Covitz et al. (2004)].  
Conclusion 1: A solvency level that is deemed optimal by the individual bank is too low from 
      a societal perspective because an insolvency causes substantial external costs. 
It may be worthwhile to emphasize that this conclusion does not suffice to justify public regu-
lation to ensure solvency. One would have to first examine whether the expected benefit of 
the intervention exceed its expected cost. An important component of this cost is caused by 
behavioral adjustments that are not intended. The present contribution belongs to this tradition 
of research, which dates back at least to Koehn and Santomero (1980). Characterizing a bank 
by its utility function and assuming it to optimize a portfolio containing both  assets and  
liabilities, they find that imposing a simple equity-to-assets ratio constraint is ineffective on 
average. Relatively safe banks become safer, while risky ones increase their risk position to 
make up for decreased leverage. In Kim and Santomero (1988), emphasis is on the choice of 
appropriate risk weights in the determination of what has become since ‘Risk-Adjusted Capi-
tal’. Here, the cost of regulation derives from non-optimal risk weights.  
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In  Rochet  (1992),  banks  choose  their  asset  portfolio  taking  into  account  limited  liability, 
which  may  cause  them  to  become  risk-lovers.  This  makes  imposing  minimum  capital  
requirements necessary to prevent them from choosing very inefficient portfolios. However, 
the effectiveness of this regulation is not guaranteed at all. John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) 
show that U.S. capital-based regulation introduced in 1991 may fail to prevent bank managers 
from shifting risk to outside financiers unless features of their compensation plans are taken 
into  account  along  with  the  opportunity  set  of  asset  investments.  More  recently,  Repullo 
(2004) explicitly has dealt with Basel II in the context of an imperfectly competitive market. 
He derives conditions for two Nash equilibria to obtain, one in which banks invest in riskless 
and another where they invest risky assets. While capital requirements on risky assets do 
enlarge the parameter space of the ‘prudent’ equilibrium, depositors bear the burden of regu-
lation in the guise of lower interest rates. That is also the reason why in Repullo (2004) capital 
requirements are in general effective in preventing excessive risk-taking by banks. Further-
more, it is shown that Basel II permits a reduction in the overall amount of capital required by 
regulation compared to Basel I. 
The present contribution differs from the earlier literature in two ways. First, it clearly distin-
guishes between the earlier Basel I and the more refined Basel II regulation, showing that the 
more recent variant may have unintended consequences only for a subset of banks rather than 
all of them. In this respect, this work elaborates on and refines the contributions by Kim and 
Santomero (1988) as well as Rochet (1992). The second distinguishing feature of this paper is 
its emphasis on dynamics in the following way. Whereas earlier contributions analyzed op-
tima or [in the case of Repullo (2004)] equilibria, here banks adjustment to shocks from a 
previous period take center stage. It is this adjustment that will be shown to be conditioned by 
solvency regulation of the Basel I and II type. In return, welfare implications will not be 
spelled out; rather, the fact that banks may be induced to act against the stated intentions of 
the regulator will be highlighted. 
3 Optimal solvency in a model of bank behavior 
Let the bank’s management maximize the (expected) rate of return on risk-adjusted capital 
(RORAC). For simplification, the model is couched in terms of nonstochastic variables; still,  
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risk enters through the fact that a higher level of solvency S enables the bank to obtain funds 
at a lower rate of interest paid on deposits rD. Therefore, one has 












         (1) 
The business portfolio (of fixed size for simplicity) has an expected return  ˆ µ  and volatility 
ˆ σ ,  comprising  an  exogenous  ( ) , µ σ   and  an  endogenous  (µ,  σ)  component  such  that 
ˆ µ µ µ = +  and  ˆ σ σ σ = + . These parameters determine the level of risk capital C required to 
attain a certain solvency level, 
( ) ˆ ˆ , , 0. C C S µ σ = >                     (2) 
Clearly, an exogenous increase in the rate of return serves to decrease this capital require-
ment, while an exogenous increase in volatility or targeted solvency serves to increase it, 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 0, 0. C C C
S µ σ
∂ ∂ ∂
⋅ < ⋅ > ⋅ >
∂ ∂ ∂
               (3) 
It is further assumed that while risk capital requirements increase with derived solvency, the 
increase is mitigated when the exogenous component of the expected rate of return  µ  on 
capital markets is high, making it easier for the bank to achieve the solvency margin. By way 
of contrast, a higher solvency level calls for even more risk capital C when volatility of in-















                (4) 
Risk capital is invested at a risk-free interest rate rf. Operating costs, taxes and restrictions 
such as equity capital regulations are being disregarded. On the basis of these assumptions, 
RORAC can be expressed as follows,  
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RORAC =  ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ , ,
ˆ ˆ , ,





.              (5) 
Since the volume of the business portfolio is assumed to be constant, the maximization of 
RORAC leads to the following first-order condition for optimal solvency, 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
ˆ *





r S C S
S C S S
µ − ∂ ∂
− = ⋅
∂ ⋅ ∂
              (6) 
with the bracket notation pointing to the fact that the endogenous determinant S has to be 
evaluated at its optimal level. Equation (6) can be interpreted as follows. It is optimal for a 
bank to weigh the increased solvency’s favorable marginal effect on the cost of refinancing 
(left-hand  side  of  the  equation,  called  marginal  return  of  solvency  in  terms  of  risk  cost) 
against its marginal downside effect on solvency (right-hand side, called the marginal cost of 
solvency). The marginal cost of solvency consists of  two interacting components. First, sol-
vency ties costly capital C. Secondly however, this cost is particularly high when the rate of 
return achievable  ˆ µ µ µ = +  exceeds by far the bank’s refinancing cost rD. 
Conclusion 2: A bank that seeks to maximize its rate of return on risk-adjusted capital is 
     predicted to  optimize its  solvency  level by  balancing  its marginal return in  
     terms of reduced cost of refinancing cost against its marginal cost in terms 
     of tied capital and foregone returns. 
Equation (6) makes clear that the optimal adjustment to an exogenous change in solvency re-
quirements is not given once and for all but importantly depends on the risk-return profile in-
herited by the banks from the past. 
Before substantiating this claim, it is worthwhile to note that fixing a certain solvency level to 
be adhered to at all times does not only entail disadvantages. One advantage is simplicity, al-
though the management of a bank may be hard put to operationalize ‘level of solvency’ in all 
circumstances. Second, the conventional policy in fact makes the cost of (re) financing inde-
pendent of investment decisions, permitting separation of the bank’s lending and borrowing 
policies,  which again  results in an important simplification of  management tasks. On the  
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downside, uniform regulation creates a similarity in the decision-making situation of regu-
lated firms, which usually results in a type of implicit collusion limiting competition. 
4 Determination of the perceived efficiency frontier 
The purpose of this section is to show how conventional solvency regulation restricts bank 
behavior. Specifically, capital requirements will be seen to affect a bank’s optimal risk-return 
trade-off. In the first period, expected returns and volatility change exogenously by  dµ  and 
dσ , respectively. During the second period, solvency adjusts optimally to these stocks ac-
cording to  dS* / dµ  and  dS* / dσ . In the third period, net adjustment dS* from the second 
period causes banks to choose µ and σ anew through adjusting their assets and liabilities. 
These adjustments result in a perceived endogenous efficiency frontier with sloped / d µ σ  
that is relevant for allocative decisions in the third period. 
4.1  Perceived efficiency frontier without regulation 




= ,                       (7) 
with R shorthand for RORAC. Now consider a shock dµ  disturbing this first-order condition. 
Since (7) is satisfied at the new optimum as well, optimal adjustment by  * dS  must be such as 











                  (8) 












.                    (9)  
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Since 
2 2 / 0 R S ∂ ∂ <   in  the  neighborhood  of  a  maximum,  sgn 
2 / R S µ   ∂ ∂ ∂     determines  
sgn [ ] */ dS dµ . Differentiating (6) w.r.t.µ , one has 
[ ] ( )
2 2 2
2




r C r C r R C C
r
S S C S C S
µ µ µ µ
µ µ µ
−∂ ∂ − − ∂ ∂     − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + ⋅ + ⋅     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
   (10)    
Using (6) to substitute for  ( ) ˆ / / D r C C S µ − ⋅∂ ∂      and ( ) ˆ / D r C µ − , respectively, and multiply-









r r r R S S C S C
S S r C S r S r C
r S C
S r C S S
µ µ
µ
µ µ µ µ
µ
µ
       ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅        ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂       
 ∂ ∂ ∂   − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
.    (11) 
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µ µ µ µ
  ∂
=   ∂ ∂  
  
             ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂     ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅                ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂                  ⋅
 ∂  
                        (12) 
Using elasticity notation, this becomes    
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*
sgn sgn sgn , , ( , )






e r S e C S e r
d S r













      ∂ ∂  = = + −            ∂ ∂ ∂        
  
∂    + − ⋅        ∂    
      (13)  
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These elasticities are treated as constant except with respect to  µ  and σ . As to signs, the 
elasticity e(rD, S) is certainly negative. Next, e(C, S) > 0 because efforts to increase solvency 
typically call for additional reserves or capital. Increased profitability  µ  permits the bank to 
reduce capital requirements, thus  ( ) , 0 e C µ < ; it also helps to obtain outside financing at a 
lower  interest  rate,  implying  ( ) , 0 D e r µ < .  The  signs  of  the  two  derivatives 
( ) / , 0 D e r S µ ∂ ∂ >      and  ( ) / , 0 e C S µ ∂ ∂ <     can be justified as follows. While a higher ex-
pected rate of return  µ  makes the bank become a better risk, permitting it to obtain outside 
finance  at  more  favorable  conditions,  this  effect  will  taper  out  sooner  or  later,  such  that 
( ) / , 0 D e r S µ ∂ ∂ >     . As to e(C, S) > 0, an increase of  µ  is likely to weaken the connection 
between solvability and capital requirements because the regulator perceives insolvency risk 
to be reduced, hence  ( ) / , 0 e C S µ ∂ ∂ <     . Using these signs in equation (13), one obtains  
* dS
dµ
> 0 for  0 µ → ; 
* dS
dµ
      0 for µ → ∞
￿
.              (14) 





sgn sgn ( )
D D
D D
r r R C C C
r C r
S S C S C S
µ
µ
σ σ σ σ σ
    ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   = − ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅       ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂      
.  (15) 
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       ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   = ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅          ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂         
  
     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅        ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂        ⋅   ∂  
       (16) 
>  <  
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Using elasticity notation once more, this becomes 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
*
sgn sgn sgn , , ( , )





e r S e C S e r
d S











     ∂ ∂        = + ⋅ −            ∂ ∂ ∂           
  
∂    + ⋅ − ⋅        ∂    
      (17) 
With increasing volatility, the interest rate to be paid for outside financing rD increases be-
cause creditors bear more risk while not participating in profits  ( ) , 0 D e r σ >    . With increas-
ing volatility, the regulator is likely to require more capital, hence  ( ) 0 , e C σ > . The signs of 
the additional derivatives can be justified as follows. While e(rD, S) < 0, effectiveness of sol-
vency effort diminishes when the bank is judged more risky due to an increase in σ , imply-
ing  ( ) / , 0 D e r S σ ∂ ∂ >     . Similarly, the regulator is likely to require that solvency efforts be 
increasingly backed up by additional reserves, thus  ( ) / , 0 e C S σ ∂ ∂ >     . Using these signs in 












→ >  for σ → ∞.              (18)  
Equations (14) and (18) define the predicted second-period adjustments in response to shocks 
that occurred in the first period. However, there can be only one net value dS* that in turn 
triggers adjustments in µ and σ during the third period. By reallocating its assets and liabili-
ties, the bank moves along a perceived efficiency frontier with slope dµ/dσ. This slope can be 
obtained by dividing (17) by (13), yielding 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, , , , , , ,
,
.
, ( , ) ( / ) ( , ) , , , ,
,
S
D D D D
D D D D D
d
d
e r S e C S e r e r S e C e r S e C S
e C S








µ µ µ µ
µ µ
+ +
+ + + − + −
+ − + − − −
− +
=
  ∂ ∂   − ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅     ∂ ∂    
    ∂ ∂   + ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅       ∂ ∂      
                            (19)  
  11 
Therefore, the bank’s perceived efficiency frontier has slope 
σ   and  µ   →  0    (terms  no.  1  and  4  of  the  numerator  and  
         denominator  vanish) 
σ  and  µ → ∞   (term no. 4 of  the numerator and denominator 
        dominates  since  ( ) ( ) D D e r S / e r ,S σ > ∂ ∂       and 






      0 otherwise. 
Figure 1 illustrates several efficiency frontiers to be discussed below. Note that µ and  µ  as 
well as σ and σ  are depicted on the same axis, respectively, reflecting the assumption that 
e.g. a low first-period value of σ  tends to translate into a low third-period σ. While the slope 
S* d / d µ σ  is undetermined for intermediate values of  µ  and σ , it must be positive some-
where to avoid banks’ systematically attaining negative rates of return. Clearly, it is not con-
stant but crucially depends on the relative size of the derivatives of  ( ) , D e r S  and  ( ) , e C S  
w.r.t. σ  and µ  [see equation (19)]. 
Conclusion 3: Due to its lagged responses to shocks in expected rate of return and volatility, 
the bank induces an endogenous efficient frontier whose slope importantly 
depends e.g. on how the elasticity of the cost of refinancing w.r.t. the level of 









<  if 
>  <  












4.2  Effects of solvency regulation on the efficiency frontier 
The objectives of solvency regulation differ from those of the bank, who by assumption seeks 
to be on the efficient ( ) , µ σ -frontier as given in (20) and depicted as 
* /
S d d µ σ  in Figure 1. 
Solvency regulation is designed to avoid the external costs caused by insolvencies described 
in Section 2. Its main instrument is capital requirements, based on the norms of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, an agency of the Bank for International Settlements. 
Two types of regulations are analyzed below. The first requires a certain equity-to-assets ra-
tio,  independent  of  the  portfolio  risk,  Basel  I,  linking  capital  requirements  only  to  asset 
classes and not to asset risk per se. The second type corresponds to Basel II, which fixes capi-
tal requirements for different asset classes as a function of the risk profile of individual assets. 









∗  * S σ
∗   * S σ
∗∗  II σ
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, σ σ  
Slope:  /
I d d µ σ  
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4.2.1 Basel I 
Basel I stipulates capital requirements as a function of total assets and separately for off-
balance sheet positions. These requirements therefore are independent of risk. In terms of the 
model, Basel I amounts to the restrictions 














.      (21)
   
The two last restrictions are implied by the fact that e(C,S) is a constant. Inserting them in 





















  → ∞  ∂   = >   ∂ 
  ∂  
              (22) 
The second statement holds also for   0 µ →  because in that case, replacing numerator and 
denominator by Taylor approximations and evaluing them at  0 µ =  yields the ratio of the two 
elasticities in (22), which is positive. 
The slope defined by eq. (22) differs from expression (19). In particular, when σ  and  0 µ → , 
* / 0
S d d µ σ <  in (19), while  /
I dµ σ ∂  in (22) remains positive. Moreover, the restrictions 
(21) cause the numerator of eq. (19) to increase and its denominator to decrease [with the sole 
exception of the term containing  ( ) , / e C S µ ∂ ∂ , which however is of second-order magnitude 
compared to  ( ) , e C S  itself]. Thus, the slope of the Basel I frontier is positive greater than that 
of the unregulated frontier for intermediate values of µ , approaching (but never crossing) the 
latter (after all, regulation cannot increase the bank’s feasible set).  
Figure 1 displays the pertinent efficiency frontier (marked with subscript I). For predicting 
optimal solutions, one needs two assumptions regarding the preferences of bank’s manage-
ment. First, while the RORAC objective of eq. (5) is defined in deterministic terms for sim-
plicity, reflecting the interest of well-diversified owners of the bank, management typically  
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exhibits risk aversion since it is much less diversified. Assuming imperfect governance, one is 
led to project their risk aversion into (µ,σ)-space, resulting in convex indifference curves. 
Second, homothecity is imposed in order to obtain sharper predictions. Under these assump-
tions, Basel I regulation induces the bank to be less conservative regardless of whether man-
agement  is  strongly  risk-averse  (type  A)  or  weakly  risk-averse  (type  B),  i.e.  ( * I S σ σ
∗ ∗ > , 
* I S σ σ
∗∗ ∗∗ > ). 
Conclusion 4: Regulation of the Basel I type may induce banks to take a more risky position 
than they would on their own, thus having a counter-productive effect. 
4.2.2 Basel II 
Basel II allows a choice of approach for the calculation of capital requirements, viz. the Stan-
dardized Approach and the Internal Ratings-Based Approach. Whilst the first is based on 
Basel I, the second lets banks choose their probability of default, their percentage loss at de-
fault, and the maturity of their credits. Large institutions with average and below-average 
credit risks mostly choose the Internal Ratings-Based approach to save on capital despite its 
higher cost of implementation.  








The  impacts  of  Basel  II  can  be  modeled  in  the  following  way.  In  eq.  (13),  a  constant 
( ) , 0 e C S >  was assumed. This is represented by the progressively increasing slope of the 
curve labeled F of Figure 2. Basel II imposes a minimum degree of solvency, denoted by  II S . 
Now let a shock  0 dσ >  occur (volatility of returns has increased). Clearly, the locus labeled 
F shifts upward to  F′, indicating that a given capital C  would now only suffice to guarantee 
a solvency level  II S S < ￿ . Therefore, in order to satisfy the Basel II norm, a bank that just satis-
fied it initially would have to come up with the full additional amount of capital ( ) C C ′−  to 
satisfy the solvency norm. A bank with excess solvency,  symbolized by the  combination 
( )
* * , S C , would not have to react to the shock  0 dσ > , however. The same conditional re-
sponses are predicted for a shock  0 dµ < , i.e. a drop in the mean return on investments. 
Conversely, consider a shock  0 dσ < , i.e. capital markets have become less volatile. This 
causes the locus F of Figure 2 to shift down to F’’. Now  C C ′′<  suffices to reach the pre-
scribed solvency level, and the “marginal” bank that was at  II S  initially can reduce capital by 
as much as ( ) C C′′ − . However, note that due to the convexity of the locus, the relaxation ef-
Figure 2: Implications of Basel II regulation 
C 




0  S ￿   II S   * S  
S 
F 
( , ) 0 e C S >  
0 dσ >  or  0 dµ <  
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fect  ( ) C C′′ −  is smaller than the tightening effect  ( ) C C ′−  for a shock of same absolute 
value. This of course holds true of  0 dµ >  as well. 
In sum, one has the following set of conditional predictions for Basel II, 





  if   0 dσ >   and  II S S = ;    0 if  0 dσ >  and  II S S > ; 





  if  0 dµ <   and  II S S =  
     0   if   0 dµ <   and   ; II S S >              (23) 




      0    if    0; dσ <  




    0  if   0. dµ >  






>   if   0, dσ >   , II S S =  and 
D r
µ
 large.            (24) 
Figure 1 illustrates once more. At low values  ( ) , µ σ , the slope of the efficiency frontier in-
duced by Basel II need not systematically differ from that induced by Basel I. The regulation 
being less stringent (at least by intent), the frontier runs higher than that of Basel I. However, 
even a strongly risk-averse management (preferences of type A) may still be induced to opt 
for a more risky allocation  ( )
* *
* II S σ σ > . According to (24), the frontier does run steeper than 
the one absent regulation at least for some banks when volatility of returns exogenously in-
creases. Therefore, a less risk-averse management (preferences of type B) is predicted to pur-
sue an investment policy that entails still higher volatility of returns than without regulation. 
The comparison with Basel I is ambiguous; however, the case  * II I S σ σ σ
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ > >  (represented in 
Figure 1) cannot be excluded for some banks. 
These banks just had satisfied the solvency norm initially, with expected returns exceeding re-
financing cost rD by a large amount. This combination of conditions is typical of an economic 
>  < 
<  > 
<  > 
<  >  
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downturn – and it is precisely in this event when Basel II induces them to opt for a riskier po-
sition than they would on their own. 
In sum, Basel I and Basel II are predicted to have similar effects in one respect. Both may in-
duce at least some banks to opt for a more rather than less risky exposure than if they were 
optimizing free of the respective restraints. However, the two regulations differ in another re-
spect. Basel I causes a “deformation” of the ( ) , µ σ -frontier that depends on two things only, 
viz. (1) how strongly  ( , ) D e r S  reacts to change in  µ  and σ , respectively, and (2) the ( ) , µ σ  
position the bank is at initially. By way of contrast, Basel II leaves the basic trade-off [as 
given by eq. (19)] intact. Its “deformation effect” is limited to high values of  µ  and a subset 
of banks. 
Conclusion 5: At least for banks just compliant initially with the solvency norm and in some 
      situations,  Basel  II  may  still  cause  banks  to  pursue  a  riskier  investment  
      policy than absent regulation, and possibly even riskier than under Basel I.  
5 Summary and conclusion 
The basic hypothesis of this paper states that banks seek to attain a certain solvency level that 
balances the advantage of lower refinancing cost against the disadvantage of tying capital that 
would yield higher returns in other uses. However, this solvency level is too low from a socie-
tal point of view because it neglects the fact that insolvency causes substantial external costs 
(Conclusion 1). The analysis proceeds to assume that banks maximize their rate of return of 
risk-adjusted capital (RORAC), which implies that the marginal benefit of a higher level of 
solvency is the lower cost of refinancing while its marginal cost consists of the extra capital to 
be allocated and return forgone (Conclusion 2). In the first period, two shocks occur, viz. an 
exogenous change in expected returns  ( ) dµ  and in their volatility  ( ) dσ . These shocks in-
duce lagged adjustments ( ) */ , */ dS d dS d µ σ  during the second period. Net adjustment dS* 
then triggers a reallocation of assets and liabilities and hence endogenous changes dµ and dσ 
during the third period. This implies a perceived endogenous frontier in  ( ) , µ σ -space with 
slope  / d d µ σ . This slope is not a constant but depends importantly on e.g. how the elasticity  
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of the cost of refinancing w.r.t. the level of solvency react to a change in volatility (Conclu-
sion 3). The regulations imposed by Basel I are now shown to neglect several elasticities and 
their dependence on  µ  and σ , causing a modification of the risk-return frontier as perceived 
by regulated banks. This modification may induce them to take a more risky position than 
they would on their own (Conclusion 4). The implications of Basel II are more complex. Still, 
banks at the initially prescribed solvency level may react to an increase in volatility by again 
taking a more risky position than they would have otherwise, even more markedly so than un-
der Basel I (Conclusion 5). 
Both  of  these  predicted  adjustments  may  be  considered  counter-productive.  However,  it 
would be inappropriate to conclude that Basel I and II or even solvency regulation in general 
should be revoked. First, the model analyzed in this paper might be too simplistic; banks pos-
sibly pursue other objectives than just maximizing RORAC. Second, Basel II already consti-
tutes an improvement over Basel I in that its counter-productive effect is limited to the (usu-
ally small) subset of banks that initially had just been compliant with the prescribed solvency 
level. And finally, assuming that solvency regulation does entail more benefit (in terms of ex-
ternal cost avoided) than cost (in terms of biasing banks’ tradeoffs between  µ  and σ ), one 
would have to find an alternative whose benefit-cost ratio beats that of Basel I and II. While 
this task is left for future analysis, the present work does call attention to likely shortcomings 
of current solvency regulation.   
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